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Notes 
THE UNLIKELY HEROES OF FAIR 
ELECTIONS: CONTEMPORARY THIRD-PARTY 




  It is uncontroversial that the Federal Election Commission fails to 
enforce campaign finance law adequately. This Note contributes to this 
discussion by analyzing more than four thousand summaries of 
standard enforcement proceedings to demonstrate the distribution of 
enforcement at the Federal Election Commission. This analysis 
indicates that the percentage of internally generated standard 
enforcement proceedings has declined precipitously, while the number 
of standard enforcement proceedings initiated each year has remained 
relatively constant. At present, the agency initiates very few standard 
enforcement proceedings. 
  Instead, third-party enforcers fill the enforcement void. Third-party 
enforcers are members of the public that monitor political actors to 
detect and subsequently enforce campaign finance violations 
informally and formally. Often, these third-party enforcers are political 
actors themselves motivated by the pursuit of partisan political gain. 
Third-party enforcers can enforce serious campaign finance violations 
because of robust disclosure law and recent technological 
advancements that have rendered campaign finance information 
readily accessible to the public for the first time.  
  In light of these changes, this Note evaluates the literature on third-
party enforcement of campaign finance violations. This Note finds that 
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the highly critical literature overlooks many of the benefits of third-
party enforcement. While the practice has drawbacks, third-party 
enforcement is a much more forceful deterrent to potential violators 
than internally generated enforcement. Consequently, this Note argues 
that third-party enforcement advances fair federal elections, and the 
Federal Election Commission should alter its Enforcement Priority 
System to capitalize on third-party enforcement and improve 
enforcement at the agency overall.  
INTRODUCTION 
On the last day of the 2012 Republican National Convention, 
Sheelah Kolhatkar, a journalist, attended a fundraiser unbeknownst to 
her host, Karl Rove.1 Rove hosted the fundraiser in support of 
American Crossroads and Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies 
(“Crossroads GPS”).2 At the event, Rove briefed Crossroads’ donors 
on the organizations’ plan to win back the Senate majority.3  
While the briefing was at times unseemly,4 it would have stayed 
within the bounds of campaign finance law, but for the following 
 
 1. Complaint at Ex. D, Crossroads Grassroots Pol’y Strategies, MUR 6696 (FEC Nov. 15, 
2012) [hereinafter Crossroads GPS Complaint], https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6696/
15044385000.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY7R-BDSM]. Kolhatkar claims that she attended the 
fundraiser as a “guest of a significant Republican donor who knew that [she] was a journalist” 
and that she was not “presented with . . . restrictions regarding the information [she] heard” at 
the event. Id. Kolhatkar acknowledges that “Crossroads disputes this version of events.” Id. 
 2. See id. (pointing out how members of Congress and staff at the fundraiser spoke in 
support of both American Crossroads and Crossroads GPS). See generally Richard L. Hansen, 
Opinion, Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS Manages To Make It Even Harder To Find the Dark Money 
in U.S. Politics, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016, 11:23 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/
la-oe-hasen-green-light-for-more-dark-money-20160212-story.html [https://perma.cc/25YU-
EVHS] (“Shortly after the Citizens United decision, Rove set up a Republican super PAC called 
American Crossroads. It wasn’t raising as much as Rove wanted, in part because some donors 
wanted to contribute anonymously. So Rove set up a sister organization — Crossroads 
GPS . . . .”). American Crossroads spent roughly $104 million in independent expenditures in the 
2012 election cycle. American Crossroads’ Independent Expenditures for the 2012 Cycle, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/indexpend.php?cycle=2012&cmte=
C00487363 [https://perma.cc/8JA8-VZZ7]. Crossroads GPS spent roughly $71 million in 
independent expenditures that same cycle. Crossroads GPS’s Outside Spending Summary for the 
2012 Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte=
C30001655&cycle=2012 [https://perma.cc/87MK-BLKN].  
 3. See Crossroads GPS Complaint, supra note 1 (noting that “Rove handled the Senate 
math” during the briefing on the fifteen competitive Senate races). 
 4. See id. (recounting how Senator Rubio, who kicked off the briefing, joked about 
Crossroads’ legal pitfalls, asking the audience, “Did I break any laws, in that speech?” to audience 
applause, and recalling a crass comment made by Governor Barbour). 
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exchange about the Ohio Senate race. As Kolhatkar later reported in 
an article published in Bloomberg Businessweek, 
Rove said that he’d had a call from an unnamed out-of-state donor 
who told him, “I really like Josh Mandel,” referring to the Ohio 
treasurer attempting to unseat Democrat Sherrod Brown. The donor, 
Rove said, had asked him what his budget was in the state; Rove told 
him $6 million. “I’ll give ya $3 million, matching challenge,” Rove said 
the donor told him. “Bob Castellini, owner of the Cincinnati Reds, is 
helping raise the other $3 million for that one.”5 
Simply, Rove claimed that a mystery donor contributed $3 million to 
Crossroads GPS for the purpose of supporting Treasurer Mandel in his 
race against Senator Brown. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971 (“FECA”) requires social welfare organizations, including 
Crossroads GPS, to disclose their donors who contribute “for the 
purpose of furthering an independent expenditure.”6 When Crossroads 
GPS declined to disclose the identity of the $3 million mystery donor 
in its FEC filings, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 
(“CREW”) filed a complaint.7 CREW’s complaint then triggered 
initiation of a Matter Under Review (“MUR”), a standard FEC 
enforcement proceeding.8 And, with that, the Citizens for 
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Federal Election 
Commission (Crossroads GPS)9 proceedings began.10  
 
 5. Id. 
 6. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)(C). 
 7. See Crossroads GPS Complaint, supra note 1, at 10–11 (claiming that “Crossroads GPS 
knowingly and willfully failed to identify the person who made $3 million in contributions for the 
purpose of furthering the independent expenditures Crossroads GPS made in the Ohio Senate 
race” because “Crossroads GPS spent $6,363,711 on independent expenditures opposing Sen. 
Brown,” “filed nine reports disclosing its independent expenditures in Ohio,” and “[n]one of the 
reports identified the person who made $3 million in contributions for the purpose of furthering 
those independent expenditures”).  
 8. Id. at 1. See generally FEC, GUIDEBOOK FOR COMPLAINANTS AND RESPONDENTS ON 
THE FEC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS 7 (2012) [hereinafter FEC, GUIDEBOOK 2012] (“If the 
complaint is deemed sufficient, [the Office of Complaints Examination and Legal 
Administration] assigns the complaint a Matter Under Review (“MUR”) number, informs the 
complainant that the complaint has been received and . . . will notify him or her once the entire 
matter has been resolved.”).  
 9. Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC (Crossroads GPS), 971 F.3d 340 (D.C. Cir. 
2020).  
 10. For a description of how Sheelah Kolhatkar’s reporting “triggered” the claim, see 
Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349, 357–58 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 
971 F.3d 340 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
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The Crossroads GPS proceedings provide an example of third-
party enforcement of campaign finance violations. Third-party 
enforcement describes a situation where an agency partly outsources 
its monitoring responsibility to the public and receives complaints as a 
means of triggering enforcement.11 Third-party enforcers, like 
journalists (think Kolhatkar) and good government groups (think 
CREW), are the heroes who rise to the monitoring challenge from 
among the public.12 They monitor the regulated community to detect 
and report legal violations to the respective regulatory agency, thereby 
spurring further investigation and, ultimately, enforcement against 
those who violate the law.13  
Several scholars have labeled third-party enforcement of 
campaign finance violations “problematic.”14 Skeptical of politically 
motived third-party enforcers,15 these scholars argue that third-party 
enforcers of campaign finance violations distort enforcement processes 
 
 11. See Todd Lochner, Dorie Apollonio & Rhett Tatum, Wheat from Chaff: Third-Party 
Monitoring and FEC Enforcement Actions, 2 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 216, 217 (2008) 
[hereinafter Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff] (“Third-party monitoring, whereby an agency 
relies upon other actors to bring legal violations to its attention, can be particularly problematic.” 
(citing EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF 
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 166–71 (1982))).  
 12. Many scholars use the term “third-party monitoring” instead of “third-party 
enforcement” to distinguish between monitoring and sanctioning processes. See, e.g., id. (using 
the terms “third-party monitoring” and “third-party monitors”). Monitoring is the process of 
detecting regulatory violations. Id. Sanctioning is “coercion” employed to correct detected 
regulatory violations. EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE 
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 123 (Routledge 2017) (1982) [hereinafter 
BARDACH & KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK]. This Note uses the term “third-party enforcement,” 
instead of “third-party monitoring,” because third-party enforcers of campaign finance violations 
engage in both monitoring and sanctioning. See Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, The Enforcement 
Blues: Formal and Informal Sanctions for Campaign Finance Violations, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 
651 (2000) [hereinafter Lochner & Cain, Enforcement Blues] (“In addition to the formal sanctions 
of civil and criminal penalties, campaign enforcement relies upon the informal sanctions of public 
opinion; those who break the law . . . may suffer at the polls as a result of public reaction to their 
infraction.”).  
 13. See infra Part II.B; Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff, supra note 11, at 218 (“Regardless 
of sanctioning strategy, a regulator must first discover wrongdoing . . . .”).  
 14. Id. at 217. 
 15. Cf. Todd Lochner, Ellen Seljan, Walker Davis, Benjamin Bardman & Rafael Swit, 
Calculating, Credible, or Both? Third-Party Monitors and Repeat Players in Federal Campaign 
Finance Enforcement, 20 ELECTION L.J. 178, 180 (2021) [hereinafter Lochner et al., Calculating, 
Credible, or Both?] (“Anecdotes . . . suggest that campaign finance monitoring likely is conducted 
by one’s political opponents, hardly a surprising conclusion given both the incentive to discredit 
the opposition and the potential that campaign finance scandals may negatively affect perceptions 
of electability.” (citations omitted)).  
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by inundating the FEC with, at best, “very transparent – and hence 
most likely trivial – violations”16 and, at worst, frivolous allegations of 
violations.17 The FEC, in turn, must expend its resources sifting 
through these frivolous complaints, instead of pursuing potentially 
more serious violations of the law.18 As a result, third-party 
enforcement of campaign finance violations is on a long list of 
structural issues plaguing the FEC, an agency that has been called 
“feckless”19 and “failed.”20  
Contrary to the pre-existing literature,21 however, third-party 
enforcers often pursue serious campaign finance violations. Serious 
campaign finance violations involve fraud, wrongdoing, or a lot of 
spending.22 Crossroads GPS, for instance, was serious in that it 
involved a lot of spending. In 2020, after eight years of litigation, the 
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a district court ruling in favor of 
CREW, invalidating a forty-year-old FEC rule that had paved the way 
for Crossroads GPS and other organizations that do not disclose their 
 
 16. Lochner & Cain, Enforcement Blues, supra note 12, at 635.  
 17. Id. at 641.  
 18. Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff, supra note 11, at 218; see Todd Lochner, 
Overdeterrence, Underdeterrence, and a (Half-Hearted) Call for a Scarlet Letter Approach to 
Deterring Campaign Finance Violations, 2 ELECTION L.J. 23, 26 (2003) (“[S]anctioning trivial or 
accidental violations saps the ability of the FEC to concentrate its efforts . . . . Unfortunately, the 
FEC’s heavy reliance on third-party monitoring . . . has worked to ensure that the most obvious, 
and often least severe, infractions will be referred to the General Counsel.”); BARDACH & 
KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK, supra note 12, at 166 (“[C]omplainants . . . can tie up inspectors 
on legally unfounded or substantively trivial claims, or divert their energies toward enterprises 
with comparatively decent compliance records. . . . Even valid complaints may divert agency 
resources . . . .”).  
 19. Editorial, The Feckless F.E.C., Rebuked, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/09/24/opinion/the-feckless-fec-rebuked.html [https://perma.cc/B9YD-
X7AZ]; see Michael M. Franz, The Devil We Know? Evaluating the Federal Election Commission 
as Enforcer, 8 ELECTION L.J. 167, 186 (2009) (“So long as the FEC is forced to expend 
enforcement resources on frivolous or politically motivated complaints, efficiency will be 
reduced.”). 
 20. Franz, supra note 19 (quoting John McCain, Opinion, Paying for Campaigns: McCain 
Eyes Next Target, USA TODAY, Nov. 4, 2004, at A27). 
 21. See, e.g., Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the Enforcement of 
Campaign Finance Laws, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1891, 1904 (1999) [hereinafter Lochner & Cain, Equity 
and Efficacy] (“Many complaints issued by third parties may lack merit, thus forcing the agency 
to expend resources responding to trivial or frivolous complaints.”).  
 22. See Ben Gaskins, Ellen Seljan, Todd Lochner, Katie Kowal, Zane Dundon & Maya 
Gold, From the FEC to the Ballot Box: Voter Accountability for Campaign Finance Law 
Violations, 47 AM. POL. RSCH. 1000, 1013 (2019) [hereinafter Gaskins et al., From the FEC to the 
Ballot Box] (listing “scandals dealing with fraud and financial wrongdoing” and those “involving 
larger sums of money” as more egregious violations).  
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donors to spend $1 billion on federal elections since 2010.23 Now, they 
must disclose their donors, implicating millions of dollars in political 
spending each election cycle.24 
As explained in this Note, third-party enforcers often pursue 
serious campaign finance violations because they have the tools and 
motivation to do so. First, due to changes in disclosure law and 
technological advancements, third-party enforcers now have access to 
the information needed to pursue serious violations.25 Second, 
politically motivated third-party enforcers specifically strive to pursue 
serious, rather than “frivolous,” violations, as these violations gain 
more traction with voters.26 Therefore, the political motivations of 
third-party enforcers, with qualification,27 are beneficial to the 
enforcement of campaign finance law,28 particularly when taking into 
account the current enforcement context of federal campaign finance 
violations. 
 
 23. See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC (Crossroads GPS), 971 F.3d 340, 343 
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(1)(vi) (2019) “conflicts with the plain terms 
of the [FECA’s] broader disclosure requirements”); Michael Beckel, Dark Money Spending Since 
Citizens United Set To Eclipse $1 Billion, ISSUE ONE (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.issueone.org/
dark-money-spending-since-citizens-united-set-to-eclipse-1-billion [https://perma.cc/MV92-
YQ4S] (“Total dark money spending since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision in 
2010 will soon eclipse $1 billion . . . .”).  
 24. See Crossroads GPS, 971 F.3d at 354 (“FECA . . . unambiguously requires an entity 
making over $250 in [independent expenditures] to disclose the name of any contributor whose 
contributions during the relevant reporting period total $200, along with the date and amount of 
each contribution.”). Compare Dave Levinthal & Sarah Kleiner, Supreme Court Lets Stand a 
Decision Requiring ‘Dark Money’ Disclosure, ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/09/supreme-court-lets-stand-a-decision-requiring-
dark-money-disclosure/570670 [https://perma.cc/7SUZ-BL3K] (claiming that the district court’s 
decision required “politically active nonprofit groups to disclose the identity of any donor giving 
more than $200 when those groups advertise for or against political candidates”), with Brad Smith, 
CREW v. FEC’s Impact on Independent Expenditures and Donor Privacy, Explained, INST. FOR 
FREE SPEECH (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.ifs.org/blog/crew-fec-decision-impact-disclosure 
[https://perma.cc/DQ2A-2E7B] (“[T]he D.C. Circuit’s opinion should not be read as requiring 
forced disclosure of all donors to nonprofit groups, but only of ‘contributions,’ i.e., donations for 
the purpose of influencing an election.”).  
 25. See infra Part II.  
 26. Cf. Gaskins et al., From the FEC to the Ballot Box, supra note 22, at 1026–27 (testing the 
effect of media coverage of campaign finance violations, finding that “voter response [was] 
somewhat proportional to the severity of the allegation”). 
 27. See infra Part III.A. 
 28. See infra Part III.B. 
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During the 2020 election cycle, the United States set staggering 
records in political spending on federal campaigns.29 Candidates and 
outside groups spent around $6.6 billion on the presidential race, which 
is “more than was spent on the White House race and every 
congressional campaign combined in 2016.”30 And “[n]ine of the 10 
most expensive Senate races ever” took place during the 2020 election 
cycle.31 At the same time, the FEC failed to enforce campaign finance 
law adequately.32 The FEC initiated only 13 percent of standard 
enforcement proceedings over the last decade, leaving much of the 
work of enforcing campaign finance violations to third-party 
enforcers.33 
This Note argues that, considering the contemporary enforcement 
context, third-party enforcement at the FEC advances fair elections. 
First, Part I explores enforcement at the FEC. In doing so, it provides 
analysis of 4,380 summaries of closed MURs published by the FEC to 
demonstrate the distribution of FEC enforcement. This analysis 
indicates that, while the number of MURs initiated each year has 
remained relatively constant since the late 1990s, the percentage of 
internally generated MURs has declined precipitously. As the FEC 
 
 29. See, e.g., 2020 Election To Cost $14 Billion, Blowing Away Spending Records, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 28, 2020, 1:51 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/10/cost-of-
2020-election-14billion-update [https://perma.cc/HE4V-246J] (“The 2020 election is more than 
twice as expensive as the runner up, the 2016 election. In fact, this year’s election will see more 
spending than the previous two presidential election cycles combined.”).  
 30. Shane Goldmacher, The 2020 Campaign is the Most Expensive Ever (By a Lot), N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/28/us/politics/2020-race-money.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZS6M-RMJD]. 
 31. Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Most Expensive Ever: 2020 Election Cost $14.4 Billion, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Feb. 11, 2021, 1:14 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2021/02/2020-
cycle-cost-14p4-billion-doubling-16 [https://perma.cc/Z8KD-S2LJ]. 
 32. See, e.g., OFF. OF COMM’R ANN M. RAVEL, FEC, DYSFUNCTION AND DEADLOCK: THE 
ENFORCEMENT CRISIS AT THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION REVEALS THE 
UNLIKELIHOOD OF DRAINING THE SWAMP 1 (2017) (“[The] Commission is not performing the 
job that Congress intended, and violators of the law are given a free pass.”). For a review of the 
leading theories as to why the FEC does not enforce campaign finance law, see infra Part I.A.II. 
 33. See Closed Matters Under Review, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/search/
enforcement [https://perma.cc/4TQP-6E97] (while the data in this Note was scraped, the same 
data can be collected by hand; in the “Case Open Date Range,” enter 01/01/2010 for “Beginning” 
and 12/31/2010 for “Ending”; repeat this query for each year from 2010 to 2018; to collect your 
data, count the number of all MURs opened each year and those initiated by the FEC during the 
same time period; then divide the number of all MURs by those initiated by the FEC). For more 
information on the data used in this Note, see infra Part I.B.  
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initiates fewer and fewer MURs, third-party enforcement plays an 
increasingly important role in deterring campaign finance violations.  
Next, Part II focuses on third-party enforcement. This Part 
outlines how third-party enforcers pursue serious campaign finance 
violations, and yet, the literature on third-party enforcement overlooks 
its benefits. Part III explains why that literature is wrong. Considering 
third-party enforcement’s elevated importance in deterring campaign 
finance violations, this Part argues that contemporary third-party 
enforcement bolsters fair elections. Last, Part IV proposes altering the 
FEC’s Enforcement Priority System to capitalize on third-party 
enforcement.  
I.  ENFORCEMENT AT THE FEC, A FAILED AGENCY 
Enforcement processes at the FEC may begin in four different 
ways: (1) a third-party enforcer files a complaint with the FEC alleging 
a campaign finance violation; (2) the FEC detects a violation on its 
own; (3) another government agency detects and then refers a violation 
to the FEC; or (4) a political actor self-reports a violation.34  
Third-party enforcers and the FEC initiate almost all standard 
enforcement proceedings.35 Within the FEC, the Reports Analysis 
Division and the Audit Division detect “potential violations through a 
review of a committee’s reports or through a Commission audit,”36 
respectively. Since 1979, the Audit Division lacks random audit 
authority but maintains the authority to audit a handful of entities.37 
 
 34. FEC, GUIDEBOOK 2012, supra note 8, at 5.  
 35. Franz, supra note 19, at 175. According to my analysis, the Department of Justice initiates 
around 2 percent of standard enforcement matters. See infra notes 74–83 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the data analyzed in this Note. And self-reporting accounts for only 0.1 percent 
of standard enforcement matters, as there were only five sua sponte reports out of the 4,546 
summaries of closed MURs. See infra notes 74–83.  
 36. Enforcing Federal Campaign Finance Law, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/
enforcement [https://perma.cc/9YRA-9YB5]. Anecdotally, the FEC is good at enforcing 
campaign finance violations that could be flagged electronically by a computer program, such as 
contributing over the legal limits and failing to file 48-hour reports. Zoom Interview with 
Samantha McClain, Former Rsch. Dir., DCCC (July 14, 2021). This pattern, in conjunction with 
the massive amount of disclosure reports filed with the agency and the paucity of the agency’s 
budget, has led some political actors to guess that the FEC does not analyze disclosure reports by 
hand at all and instead runs computer programs that detect some violations. Id.  
 37. See AUDIT DIV., FEC, THE FEC AUDIT PROCESS: WHAT TO EXPECT 2 (2012), https://
www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/audit_process.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7RJ-
WXPL] (“Other than the mandatory audits of publicly financed Presidential campaigns and 
national party convention committees, Section 438(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
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These divisions within the FEC refer detected violations to the Office 
of General Counsel (“General Counsel”) to proceed with enforcement 
through one of the FEC’s enforcement processes.38 
This Part first details the FEC’s enforcement processes that are 
utilized after a third-party enforcer or the FEC detects a violation. 
Next, it reviews the most common criticism of FEC enforcement. Last, 
this Part contributes data on FEC enforcement with this criticism in 
mind. Lending support to arguments that the FEC is unwilling or 
unable to adequately enforce campaign finance law, analysis of the 
data reveals that the FEC initiates very few standard enforcement 
proceedings on its own. The FEC has initiated ever fewer standard 
enforcement proceedings over the last several decades, a trend that, in 
theory, could continue to the point where internal enforcement is 
practically nonexistent.  
A. Background on the Enforcement of Campaign Finance Law 
1. Enforcement Processes at the FEC.  In response to continued 
criticism, the FEC has altered its enforcement processes over time.39 
At present, there are three different enforcement processes at the 
FEC, varying in speed and strength: the Administrative Fine, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”), and Matter Under Review 
(“MUR”) processes. The Administrative Fine and ADR processes are 
alternatives to the traditional MUR process,40 intended to expedite 
enforcement of trivial violations.41  
 
(FECA) allows the Commission to audit a committee if its reports do not meet the threshold 
requirements for substantial compliance . . . .”).  
 38. FEC, GUIDEBOOK 2012, supra note 8.  
 39. See, e.g., Federal Election Law Enforcement (C-SPAN television broadcast Dec. 13, 
1993), https://www.c-span.org/video/?52961-1/federal-election-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/AH9K-
XY9Q] (listing changes implemented to address the “simply overwhelming” enforcement 
workload and the resulting “lengthy delays . . . unacceptable to the Commission and staff”). 
 40. FEC, GUIDEBOOK 2012, supra note 8, at 23–25; FEC Enforcement Programs, FEC, https:/
/www.fec.gov/press/resources-journalists/fec-enforcement-programs [https://perma.cc/7KBX-MCY6].  
 41. See Administrative Fines, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,787, 31,787 (May 19, 2000) (codified at 11 
C.F.R. pt. 104, 111) (“[C]ivil money penalties for violations of the reporting requirements of the 
FECA . . . are intended to expedite and streamline the Commission’s enforcement procedures.”); 
Agency Procedures, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,494, 74,495 (Dec. 8, 2008) (“The ADR program was 
established . . . to promote compliance with the law . . . . ADR results in an expeditious resolution 
that allows participants in the program to have an active role in shaping the settlement, and, as a 
result, reducing costs for respondents and the Commission.”); OFF. OF COMM’R ANN M. RAVEL, 
supra note 32, at 6 (“Matters that are less complicated, depending on the circumstances, may be 
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Implemented in May 2000, the Administrative Fine process 
handles the most trivial of campaign finance violations.42 Specifically, 
it handles “(1) failure to file reports on time, (2) failure to file reports 
at all, and (3) failure to file 48-Hour Notices of contributions”43 by 
shelling out “automatic ‘parking ticket’ fines” for these violations.44 
“By most impressionistic accounts, the structural change has been a 
success, moving minor violations outside of the MUR process and 
allowing more time for more serious and consequential enforcement 
cases.”45  
The ADR and MUR processes handle all other campaign finance 
violations. To determine whether and which enforcement process to 
initiate, the General Counsel rates a matter under the Enforcement 
Priority System (“EPS”).46 “The EPS is a comprehensive case 
management system that . . . is designed to focus the Commission’s 
limited resources on significant cases . . . .”47 The EPS supplies 
objective criteria against which the General Counsel rates a matter.48 
These criteria have changed over time.49 And although the EPS is 
 
referred to an Alternative Dispute Resolution program or the Commission’s Administrative 
Fines Program.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 42. See FEC, PRIORITY LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2001), https://www.fec.gov/
resources/cms-content/documents/legrec2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ27-9PME] (explaining that 
the Administrative Fines program was implemented to address violations of filing deadlines). 
 43. FEC, GUIDEBOOK 2012, supra note 8, at 24.  
 44. Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff, supra note 11.  
 45. Franz, supra note 19, at 172. 
 46. See FEC, GUIDEBOOK 2012, supra note 8, at 11 (stating that the OGC uses the EPS to 
evaluate and prioritize matters).  
 47. Brief for the FEC, Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FEC, 180 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (No. 98-
5355), 1998 WL 35240183, at *30 n.6. The General Counsel began using the EPS as an exercise of 
the FEC’s broad prosecutorial discretion. Id. at *28.  
 48. See FEC, GUIDEBOOK 2012, supra note 8, at 11 (“OGC evaluates the complaint and 
response, if any, using objective criteria approved by the Commission under its Enforcement 
Priority System.”).  
 49. Compare Press Release, FEC, FEC Strengthens Enforcement by Implementing 
Prioritization of Cases (Dec. 13, 1993), https://www.fec.gov/resources/news_releases/1993/
19931213_Enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG29-AP5D] (announcing, along with the creation 
of the EPS, that the FEC would consider the following factors: “the presence of knowing and 
willful intent; the apparent impact the alleged violation had on the election; the amount of money 
involved; the age and timing of the violation; and whether a particular legal area needs special 
attention”), with Memorandum from Lois G. Lerner, Acting Gen. Couns., FEC, on the 
Modifications to the Enforcement Priority System and Public Financing Enforcement Priority 
System for Media Exemption Cases to the FEC (Jan. 26, 2001), https://www.fec.gov/resources/
cms-content/documents/letter_to_Committee_on_House_Administration_July_25_2013.pdf 
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confidential,50 the FEC discloses that some of the criteria supplied by 
the EPS are whether “a substantial amount of activity [is] involved, 
[the] high legal complexity, the presence of possible knowing and 
willful intent, and potential violations in areas that the Commission has 
set as priorities.”51  
After rating matters under the EPS, the General Counsel 
dismisses low-rated matters, among others, and may pursue more 
highly rated matters.52 Remedied violations, “low-rated” matters, and 
“stale cases” (more highly rated matters that remain unassigned to 
enforcement staff due to resource constraints) are typically dismissed.53 
At this time, some highly rated matters may be referred to ADR, an 
“option extended to appropriate cases,”54 which “seeks cooperative, 
expedient resolution to low-level violations.”55 ADR employs remedial 
measures and settles matters before the FEC has to take any further 
 
[https://perma.cc/CH6Q-6X5D] (adding a factor to the EPS in order to dismiss “cases clearly 
falling within the media exemption”).  
 50. See Memorandum from FEC on MUR Closeout Procedures Training: Public Record 
Review Process (Mar. 11, 2009), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/
additional_enforcement_materials.pdf [https://perma.cc/LB2W-FGH2] (listing the following 
redactions from public records: “FEC deliberative process – anything [the General Counsel] 
recommended to the Commission that was rejected. (FOIA Exemption 5)” and “How the 
Commission determines civil penalties (legal strategy) (FOIA Exemption 5) (Note- The 
calculations used to determine the opening offer is kept off under FOIA Exemption 5. . . .)” ); E-
mail from Katrina Sutphin, FOIA/PA Attorney, FEC (May 20, 2021, 9:24 AM) (on file with 
author) (denying a FOIA request for “[a] copy of all of the Enforcement Priority System criteria 
that the FEC currently uses to rate enforcement matters,” under Exemption 7(E)).  
 51. FEC, GUIDEBOOK 2012, supra note 8, at 11. 
 52. See id. (“In general, matters that are deemed high priority . . . are preliminarily assigned 
to the Enforcement Division. Matters not warranting the further use of Commission resources 
are recommended for dismissal.”). 
 53. Press Release, FEC, Compliance Cases Made Public (Apr. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Press 
Release, FEC, Compliance Cases Made Public], https://www.fec.gov/updates/compliance-cases-
made-public-40 [https://perma.cc/SJ6D-YZMH]. The FEC may pursue low-rated matters if 
resources permit. FEC, FEC Targets Higher-Priority Enforcement Cases, RECORD, Sept. 1994, at 
3, 3, https://www.fec.gov/resources/record/1994/september1994.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH2Q-R489]. 
 54. Alternative Dispute Resolution, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/enforcement/
alternative-dispute-resolution [https://perma.cc/B3EC-8863]; see also Press Release, FEC, FEC 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Program Continues To Show Impressive Results (Jan. 23, 2008), 
https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-alternative-dispute-resolution-program-continues-to-show-
impressive-results [https://perma.cc/3WPP-D3FB] (“For a case to be considered for ADR 
treatment, a respondent must express willingness to engage in the ADR process, agree to set aside 
the statute of limitations while the case is being resolved and participate in mediation, if 
appropriate.”).  
 55. Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff, supra note 11.  
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action.56 If a matter is highly rated under the EPS, assigned to 
enforcement staff, and inappropriate for ADR, then the MUR process 
may begin in earnest.57 The MUR process, the standard enforcement 
process, handles all “novel, complex, or sophisticated matters.”58 
If the General Counsel decides to resolve a matter through the 
MUR process, the enforcement process slows down immensely, as a 
quorum of commissioners must vote to approve each subsequent step 
of the proceedings.59 First, a quorum must vote to find “reason to 
believe” that the respondent violated campaign finance law.60 Then, 
after investigation by FEC staff, a quorum must vote to find probable 
cause that a violation has occurred.61 Next, a quorum must vote to open 
settlement negotiations to resolve the matter.62 Last, if the negotiations 
fail, a quorum must vote to file a lawsuit instead.63 If the commissioners 
deadlock in their votes or vote against proceeding at any point in this 
process, the MUR may be dismissed.64  
2. Criticism of Enforcement at the FEC.  Criticism of FEC 
enforcement is relentless.65 While “critics differ as to the causes of the 
problem, almost all agree that the FEC fails to effectively enforce the 
 
 56. See FEC, GUIDEBOOK 2012, supra note 8, at 23 (noting that the ADR was created to 
encourage settlements outside the regular enforcement process). If ADR fails, though, “the 
matter is returned to the traditional MUR” process. Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff, supra note 
11, at 220.  
 57. FEC, GUIDEBOOK 2012, supra note 8, at 11. 
 58. OFF. OF COMM’R ANN M. RAVEL, supra note 32, at 6. 
 59. See id. at 6–7 (noting that an affirmative vote of four commissioners is needed at each 
stage, providing opportunities for commissioners to block action).  
 60. Id. at 6. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. FEC, GUIDEBOOK 2012, supra note 8, at 5; see id. at 7 (“Importantly, at every stage 
discussed above, the affirmative vote of four commissioners is necessary to move forward. This 
provides ample opportunity for commissioners to block action by splitting 3-to-3.”); see also Press 
Release, Ellen L. Weintraub, Vice Chair, FEC, Statement on the D.C. Circuit’s Decision in Crew 
v. FEC (June 22, 2018), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/2018-06-
22_ELW_statement_re_CREWvFEC-CHGO.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7S3-KTPF] (referring to 
the phenomenon as “deadlock-driven FEC dismissals”).  
 65. Jennifer A. Heerwig & Katherine Shaw, Through a Glass, Darkly: The Rhetoric and 
Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 102 GEO. L.J. 1443, 1477 (2014). 
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law.”66 There are three common camps of criticism.67 The first holds 
that the FEC is unwilling to enforce the law.68 Proponents of this camp 
argue that a cohort of commissioners “routinely thwarts, obstructs, and 
delays action” on enforcement matters because they are ideologically 
opposed to enforcement.69 The second camp holds that the FEC wants 
to effectively enforce the law but lacks the tools necessary to do so.70 
Here, proponents argue that enforcement at the FEC is ineffective 
because the “chance is slim that violations will be detected . . . and any 
resulting penalty will probably come long after.”71 For example, on 
several occasions, the FEC has lacked the quorum necessary to initiate 
enforcement.72 Last, the third camp holds that the FEC overzealously 
enforces the law, chilling protected speech in the process.73  
As demonstrated in the next Section of this Note, the enforcement 
record at the FEC supports arguments that the FEC is unwilling or 
unable to adequately enforce campaign finance law. Consequently, this 
Note lends equal support to the first and second camps of criticism. 
 
 66. Lochner & Cain, Equity and Efficacy, supra note 21, at 1893 (citation omitted).  
 67. See Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff, supra note 11, at 219 (presenting this useful framing 
of criticism leveled at the FEC). 
 68. Id. (citation omitted). 
 69. OFF. OF COMM’R ANN M. RAVEL, supra note 32.  
 70. See Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff, supra note 11, at 219 (explaining that the second 
camp views the FEC as lacking the necessary enforcement tools). 
 71. Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A System in Search of 
Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 279, 286–87 (1991).  
 72. R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45160, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: 
MEMBERSHIP AND POLICYMAKING QUORUM, IN BRIEF 6 (2020) [hereinafter GARRETT, 
MEMBERSHIP AND POLICYMAKING QUORUM]. The FEC lacked a quorum for the third time in 
its history. Id. at 1; Fredreka Schouten, Senate Confirms New Members and Restores Power to 
Long-Hobbled Federal Election Commission, CNN (Dec. 9, 2020, 5:30 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/12/09/politics/senate-confirms-fec-members/index.html [https://perma.cc/W8SV-RND5]. 
The FEC is led by six commissioners. Leadership and Structure, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/about/
leadership-and-structure [https://perma.cc/X5U7-EKRP]. The FECA requires a quorum of at 
least four agreeing votes for the FEC to take any kind of official action. See 52 U.S.C. § 30106(c) 
(“All decisions of the Commission with respect to the exercise of its duties and powers under the 
provisions of this Act shall be made by a majority vote of the members of the Commission.”). 
Without a quorum, the FEC cannot “hold hearings, issue rules, and enforce campaign finance 
law.” GARRETT, MEMBERSHIP AND POLICYMAKING QUORUM, supra, at Summary (emphasis 
added). “Although new enforcement or policy matters cannot advance until a quorum is 
reconstituted, a repopulated commission could consider older matters,” so, at best, lack of a 
quorum creates a backlog of enforcement matters, id. at 8; at worst, lack of quorum results in the 
complete failure of the FEC to enforce campaign finance law.  
 73. See Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff, supra note 11, at 219 (noting that the third camp 
views the FEC as chilling legitimate behavior by pushing the limits of enforcement). 
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B. Enforcement at the FEC by the Numbers 
This Note provides analysis of 4,380 summaries of closed MURs, 
the standard enforcement process at the FEC, to demonstrate the 
distribution of internally generated and third-party-generated 
enforcement at the FEC. For closed MURs as far back as 1977,74 the 
FEC discloses a summary of a closed MUR within thirty days of 
notifying the parties involved in the proceeding that the case has been 
closed.75 In each summary, the FEC discloses the respondents, 
complainants, subject, disposition, and documents pertaining to the 
MUR.76 The respondents are those alleged to have violated campaign 
finance law; the complainant is the party who filed the MUR; the 
subject, if provided, is a one or two-word categorization of the alleged 
violation; and the documents are the filings.77 Each closed MUR has an 
open and close date.78 The open date is “within a few days of the 
Complaint,” and the close date records the MUR’s last certification.79  
The data used in this Note denotes parties involved in closed 
MURs from 1987 to 2018.80 The MUR number, respondents, 
complainants, and open and close dates for the summaries of closed 
MURs from 1987 to 2020, beginning with MUR #2465 and ending with 
 
 74. Closed Matters Under Review, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/search/enforcement 
[https://perma.cc/8JTU-WZEN].  
 75. FEC Enforcement Programs, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/press/resources-journalists/fec-
enforcement-programs [https://perma.cc/438W-5V8M].  
 76. For an example of a summary of a closed MUR, see Crossroads Grassroots Pol’y 
Strategies, MUR 6696 (FEC Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6696/
15044385000.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY7R-BDSM].  
 77. Glossary of Terms, FEC, https://eqs.fec.gov/eqs/terms.html [https://perma.cc/EP65-
2KR7]; FEC Enforcement Programs, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/press/resources-journalists/fec-
enforcement-programs [https://perma.cc/438W-5V8M].  
 78. E-mail from Jason Bucelato, Senior Pub. Affs. Specialist, FEC (Sept. 14, 2020, 11:47 AM) 
(on file with author). 
 79. Id. 
 80. This Note excludes data from 2019 to 2021 because many cases initiated in these years 
are likely ongoing. See Memorandum from Lisa J. Stevenson, Acting Gen. Couns., Charles 
Kitcher, Acting Assoc. Gen. Couns. for Enf’t, and Jeff S. Jordan, Acting Assoc. Gen. Couns. for 
Enf’t, to the Comm’n on the Status of Enforcement – Fiscal Year 2020, Fourth Quarter (7/1/20–
9/30/20) (Nov. 2, 2020) [hereinafter FEC Memorandum on the Status of Enforcement], https://
www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/4th_Quarter_Status_of_Enforcement_2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CJC3-VVH2] (reporting that the “Average Days from Receipt to Closing” cases 
was 530 in fiscal year 2020, 630 in fiscal year 2019, and 436 in fiscal year 2018). As summaries of 
ongoing cases are not publicized by the FEC, Lochner et al., Calculating, Credible, or Both?, supra 
note 15, the summaries of closed MURs from these years may fail to elucidate an overview of the 
MURs initiated in these years.  
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MUR #7704, were scraped81 on September 8, 2020. It produced results 
for 4,546 summaries of closed MURs.82 For all summaries of archived 
closed MURs, the data includes open and close dates; for all summaries 
of closed MURs that are not archived, the data includes proxy “open” 
and “close” dates, as the specific open and close dates are not included 
in the summaries of those closed MURs.83 Instead, the data includes 
dates of two associated document entries as proxies.  
The data reveals that, while the number of MURs initiated each 
year has remained relatively constant since the late 1990s, the 
percentage of internally generated MURs has declined precipitously 
over time. Figure 1 plots the number of closed MURs initiated each 
year, according to their actual or proxy open and close dates.84 As 
shown in Figure 1, many more MURs were filed yearly in the late 1980s 
and 1990s than in recent years. After reaching a peak of around 300 
MURs filed in 1994, there was a steep decline in the number of MURs 
 
 81. Scraping, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/scraping [https://
perma.cc/BM9Y-6TU2] (defining scraping as “the process of extracting data from a digital 
source for automated replication, formatting, or manipulation by a computer program, as in data 
mining or website data analysis”).  
 82. As you will see below, when excluding data from closed MURs from 2019 and 2020, the 
total number of summaries of closed MURs analyzed becomes 4,380. 
 83. MURs closed before 1999 are archived, and later MURs are not archived. See E-mail 
from Jason Bucelato, Senior Pub. Affs. Specialist, FEC (Sept. 28, 2020, 9:10 AM) (on file with 
author). Summaries of archived closed MURs look a little bit different than other summaries. 
First, summaries of archived closed MURs include their open and close dates, while summaries 
of other closed MURs do not. Compare Seminole Tribe of Fla., MUR 2465 (FEC May 1, 1990), 
https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/2465 [https://perma.cc/N2KH-7BPT], with 
Tiffany for Wis., Inc., MUR 7704 (FEC Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-
under-review/7704 [https://perma.cc/Q425-P3V8]. The open and close dates for those MURs are 
still available, though, when browsing through the search results for closed MURs. See Closed 
Matters Under Review, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/search/enforcement [https://
perma.cc/KVM4-K896]. Second, summaries of archived closed MURs provide a link to case 
documents in one file. Summaries of other closed MURs include a log of linked documents, 
denoting the type, date, and title of each document. Compare Seminole Tribe of Fla., MUR 2465 
(FEC May 1, 1990), https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/2465 [https://perma.cc/
N2KH-7BPT], with Tiffany for Wis., Inc., MUR 7704 (FEC Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.fec.gov/
data/legal/matter-under-review/7704 [https://perma.cc/Q425-P3V8].  
 84. Since some of the dates correspond to the actual open and close dates of the closed 
archived MURs, while others refer to the dates of documents associated with the closed MURs, 
the data in general and this Figure in particular should not be relied on as a reference for the 
specific number of MURs initiated in a given year. Although Figure 1 is not a perfect record of 
the number of MURs initiated each year, this Figure is a reliable mapping of trends over time 
because it provides information about when more than four thousand MURs were initiated. 
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initiated each year.85 The number of MURs initiated per year has 
remained relatively constant since around the late 1990s, at around 100 
to 150 MURs initiated per year.  
Figure 1: Matters Under Review Initiated per Year 
 
At the same time, in contrast to the consistency seen in Figure 1, 
the percentage and number of internally generated MURs have both 
declined. Figure 2 plots the percentage of internally generated closed 
MURs in comparison to all closed MURs.86 Figure 2 shows a 
precipitous decline in the percentage of internally generated MURs 
since the 1980s, dipping below 10 percent of all MURs multiple times 
over the past two decades.  
 
 85. This decline could be the result of the Administrative Fines and ADR processes at the 
FEC that were implemented to direct complaints away from the MUR process. See supra notes 
40–56 and accompanying text.  
 86. Closed MURs that either do not list a complainant or list the FEC as the complainant 
are internally generated. E-mail from Jason Bucelato, Senior Pub. Affs. Specialist, FEC (Sept. 3, 
2020, 3:46 PM) (on file with author). As a result, MURs initiated by the following complainants 
were recorded as internally generated: none (blank), Audit Division, Reports Analysis Division, 
or FEC. While Figure 2 is also not a perfect record of the percentage of internally generated 
MURs initiated each year, this figure reliably maps the trends of internally generated MURs over 
time. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Internally Generated Matters Under Review 
per Year 
 
This decline is attributable to both decreasing internally generated 
MURs and increasing third-party-generated MURs. Figure 3 plots the 
number of internally generated and third-party-generated MURs over 
time.87 After peaking around two hundred MURs in 1991, the number 
of internally generated MURs declined steadily, hitting a low of just 
seven internally generated MURs initiated in 2010. Simultaneously, 
since the early 2000s, third-party-generated MURs increased overall. 
The increase in third-party-generated MURs appears to be less drastic 
and more variable than the steady decrease in internally generated 
MURs, apparent in Figure 3.  
 
 87. MURs initiated by complainants other than the FEC, Department of Justice, or sua 
sponte were recorded as initiated by third-party enforcers. This Figure should not be relied on as 
a reference for the specific number of MURs initiated in a given year. See supra note 84. 
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Figure 3: Internally & Third-Party-Generated Matters Under Review 
per Year 
 
Moreover, review and analysis of more than four thousand 
summaries of closed MURs indicates that, while the number of MURs 
initiated each year has remained relatively constant since the late 
1990s, the percentage of internally generated MURs has declined 
precipitously. The FEC initiates very few MURs on its own. This 
finding aligns with the handful of studies on contemporary third-party 
enforcement at the FEC,88 and it lends support to arguments that the 
FEC is unwilling or unable to adequately enforce campaign finance 
law.89  
 
 88. See Lochner et al., Calculating, Credible, or Both?, supra note 15, at 184 (“Very few FEC-
initiated cases are ultimately decided in the MUR program, . . . whereas this is the most common 
venue for the enforcement of third-party-initiated allegations. Indeed, of the total 1,237 cases 
heard under the MUR track, 87 percent (1,077) were brought by third parties.”); Franz, supra 
note 19, at 174 (mapping the distribution of complainants). 
 89. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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II.  DISCLOSURE BEGETS EFFECTIVE CONTEMPORARY THIRD-
PARTY ENFORCEMENT 
While the data shows that internally generated enforcement at the 
FEC has deteriorated, legal developments have allowed third-party 
enforcers to step in and fill the void. The FECA,90 in addition to 
establishing the FEC, created contemporary disclosure law.91 
Disclosure law helps facilitate two processes that ensure that 
information travels from political actors to voters.92 First, political 
actors report their campaign contributions and expenditures to the 
FEC, and second, the FEC disseminates that information to the 
public.93  
As this Part explains, disclosure law and technological 
advancements have had a synergistic effect on disclosure; the 
combination of robust disclosure law and recent technological 
advancements renders massive amounts of campaign finance 
information readily available to third-party enforcers for the first time. 
This Part delineates how contemporary third-party enforcers use this 
information to effectively detect and enforce campaign violations 
informally and formally. Despite this, several scholars dismiss third-
party enforcement as ineffective and detrimental to enforcement at the 
FEC overall. The final Section of this Part will explain why those 
assumptions are incorrect.  
A. Background on Disclosure Law 
Disclosure law has developed over time, whereas much of 
campaign finance law has crumbled. The nine times that the U.S. 
Supreme Court tested the FECA and its later amendments, the Court 
struck down an array of provisions contained within these laws but 
 
 90. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as 
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146). 
 91. See Mission and History, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/about/mission-and-history [https://
perma.cc/5NV5-2VHV] (“Congress consolidated its earlier reform efforts in the Federal Election 
Campaign Act . . . . Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1974 to set limits 
on contributions by individuals, political parties and PACs. The 1974 amendments also 
established an independent agency, the FEC.”).  
 92. See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 276 (2010) 
(“Disclosure is a shorthand term for what is really a two-step process: reports by electoral actors 
to a government agency concerning campaign contributions and expenditures, and dissemination 
of that information to the public.”).  
 93. Id.  
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consistently upheld their disclosure provisions.94 The Court 
determined, at least in part, that because disclosure law was so robust, 
additional campaign finance restrictions were unnecessary to advance 
government interests and, therefore, too speech restrictive.95  
As a result of the expansion of disclosure law over time, political 
actors report a lot of data to the FEC.96 Congressional campaign 
committees, for instance, must file quarterly, pre-primary, pre-general, 
and post-general election disclosure reports, among others.97 These 
reports detail every contribution received, including the name, 
occupation, employer, and mailing address of the contributor, the date 
and amount of the contribution, and the aggregate amount of the 
contributor’s contributions.98 As noted, Crossroads GPS now requires 
 
 94. Id. at 274; see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51, 84, 143 (1976) (per curiam) (striking 
down expenditure limits and the appointment procedures for FEC commissioners, while 
upholding disclosure requirements); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 241–43, 
263 (1986) (finding the FECA’s ban on direct corporate expenditures unconstitutional as applied 
to Massachusetts Citizens for Life); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 
604, 613 (1996) (finding the party expenditure limits unconstitutional as applied); McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201–02 (2003) (upholding disclosure requirements enacted under the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”)), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 455–57 (2007) (finding BCRA’s 
electioneering communication restrictions unconstitutional as applied to Wisconsin Right to 
Life’s advertising); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365, 370–71 (striking down prohibitions against 
corporate expenditures, while upholding disclosure requirements); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 
185, 223–24, 227 (2014) (plurality opinion) (striking down aggregate contribution limits, while 
praising disclosure requirements). But see FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 
U.S. 431, 437 (2001) (rejecting a facial challenge to party coordinated spending limits); Beaumont 
v. FEC, 539 U.S. 146, 149–50, 163 (2003) (upholding a prohibition against corporate contributions 
to nonprofit advocacy corporations); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 728–29, 740, 744 (2008) (striking 
down the “Millionaire’s Amendment” and its corresponding disclosure requirements).  
 95. See Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 65, at 1459 (“[N]ot only did the Court conclude that 
BCRA’s disclosure requirements passed constitutional muster, but the existence and content of 
those requirements was arguably a critical component of the Court’s conclusion that the 
substantive limitation violated the First Amendment.”); see also McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 224 
(plurality opinion) (“With modern technology, disclosure now offers a particularly effective 
means of arming the voting public with information. In 1976, the Court observed that Congress 
could regard disclosure as ‘only a partial measure.’ . . . Today, given the Internet, disclosure offers 
much more robust protections against corruption.”).  
 96. See Briffault, supra note 92, at 273 (describing the origins and development of disclosure 
law).  
 97. See Filing Candidate Reports, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-
committees/filing-reports [https://perma.cc/QE3B-YM4C].  
 98. See Recording Receipts, FEC https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/
keeping-records/recording-receipts [https://perma.cc/MG9M-ZWB7], requiring this information 
if the contributor’s aggregate contribution exceeds $200. If the aggregate contribution is less than 
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disclosing contributors to independent expenditures as well.99 Robust 
disclosure law facilitates the first process of disclosure: political actors 
report their campaign contributions and expenditures to the FEC.100 
Before the technological advancements of electronic filing and 
online disclosure, however, the FEC did not effectively disseminate 
disclosed campaign finance information to the public, stymying the 
second process of disclosure. Before 1997, all political actors filing 
under the FECA filed paper records of their disclosure reports.101 If a 
member of the public wanted to see these reports, that person would 
travel to the FEC’s office and then “laboriously examine, and, for a fee, 
copy microfilmed campaign finance reports.”102 As a result, 
comprehensively analyzing disclosure reports was “almost 
impossible.”103  
To further the disclosure purposes of the FECA, the FEC 
permitted political actors to electronically file their disclosure reports 
beginning in 1997.104 In 2001, the FEC began requiring House and 
 
$200, then only the amount, date of receipt, contributor’s name, and mailing address may be 
required for the contribution. Id. 
 99. See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC (Crossroads GPS), 971 F.3d 340, 354 
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (“FECA (c)(1) unambiguously requires an entity making over $250 in IEs to 
disclose the name of any contributor whose contributions during the relevant reporting period 
total $200, along with the date and amount of each contribution.”).  
 100. As is apparent from the Crossroads GPS proceedings, however, sometimes political 
actors do not abide by disclosure requirements. See id. at 344; Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 65, at 
1480–81, 1483 (finding that “contributor compliance with disclosure requirements is often 
minimal,” pointing to one contributor who listed his employer as “‘Dunder Mifflin’—the fictional 
office supply company featured on the popular television show The Office”). In addition to 
outright noncompliance with disclosure law, partial compliance is a persistent problem. Heerwig 
& Shaw, supra note 65, at 1480–81.  
 101. FEC, Final Rules on Electronic Filing, RECORD, Oct. 1996, at 3, 3, https://www.fec.gov/
resources/record/1996/oct96.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VCJ-R7A2] (“On August 15, 1996, the FEC 
published new rules implementing an electronic filing system for campaign finance reports filed 
with the agency (61 FR 42371). The electronic filing system will be in place in time for the 1997-
98 election cycle (i.e., for reports covering activity after December 31, 1996).”).  
 102. Briffault, supra note 92, at 277 (quoting CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. TASK FORCE ON 
DISCLOSURE, WEBSITE WOES: THE FEDERAL NON-SYSTEM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
DISCLOSURE 5 (2002), http://www.cfinst.org/disclosure/pdf/WebsiteWoes.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7W9M-98XC]).  
 103. Federal Election Commission Records Room (C-SPAN television broadcast June 24, 
1993), https://www.c-span.org/video/?43738-1/federal-election-commission-records-room [https:/
/perma.cc/3K5V-N86F].  
 104. See Electronic Filing of Reports by Political Committees, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,371, 42,372 
(Aug. 15, 1996) (codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 104) (“The system will also provide the public with more 
complete on-line access to reports on file with the Commission, thereby furthering the disclosure 
purposes of the [FECA].”). 
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presidential candidates (who raise or spend more than $50,000 in 
contributions or expenditures) to electronically file their reports.105 
The Senate only followed suit in 2018.106  
Additionally, well into the 2010s, the online disclosure portal of 
the FEC website, where the agency publishes disclosure reports, was 
inaccessible to most of the public.107 “Using the files involve[d] 
downloading thousands or possibly millions of records, having access 
to a software program capable of reading a large amount of data 
(generally beyond the capacity of Microsoft Excel), and then creating 
a corresponding ‘data dictionary’ for the disclosure information to be 
properly formatted.”108 The FEC has since changed its website to make 
the data more accessible—no special software programs or data 
dictionaries required.109 Instead, the FEC publishes the disclosed 
campaign finance data online in an easily searchable and downloadable 
format.110  
While a political actor could once rest assured that their disclosed 
campaign finance information was “unlikely to be seen by anyone,”111 
that is no longer the case. Contemporary disclosure law requires 
political actors to disclose a lot of campaign finance information to the 
 
 105. See Dorothy Yeager, Mandatory Electronic Filing, FEC (Mar. 1, 2011), https://
www.fec.gov/updates/mandatory-electronic-filing [https://perma.cc/5L2A-YSRB] (requiring all 
federal filers, apart from Senate campaigns, to electronically file reports).  
 106. See Michael Beckel, Senate Candidates To Begin E-Filing Campaign Finance Reports 
After Issue One-Backed Policy Is Signed into Law, ISSUE ONE (Sept. 21, 2018), https://
www.issueone.org/senate-candidates-to-begin-e-filing-campaign-finance-reports-after-issue-one-
backed-policy-is-signed-into-law [https://perma.cc/U5Q2-79P8] (“U.S. Senate candidates will 
begin electronically filing their campaign finance reports in October thanks to a provision 
contained in an appropriations bill signed into law today by President Donald Trump.”).  
 107. See Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 65, at 1486 (“The bulk of . . . disclosure data, including 
information about the sources from which a candidate has received money over time . . . [we]re 
formatted as raw text files—to the untrained eye, they appear[ed] as long rows of jumbled letters 
and numbers.”).  
 108. Id.  
 109. See Fredreka Schouten, Exclusive: FEC Overhauls Website To Make It Easier To Track 
Campaign Money, USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2015, 11:51 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/politics/elections/2015/10/27/fec-updates-website-2016-election/74672832 [https://perma.cc/
458B-CWAQ] (“On the new site, information about all the candidates running for a single office 
is grouped together, allowing users to see at a glance who is seeking the presidency . . . and how 
their fundraising compares with rivals. The updated version also boasts a streamlined, easy-to-
read look.”).  
 110. See Campaign Finance Data, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/data [https://perma.cc/X4D6-
E29N].  
 111. William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political Contribution 
Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 11–12 (2003).  
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FEC. The FEC, in turn, effectively disseminates that information to the 
public using new technologies. Together, robust disclosure law and 
technological advancements render massive amounts of campaign 
finance information readily available for the first time.  
B. Third-Party Enforcers Rely Upon Disclosed Information 
Third-party enforcers are some of the members of the public that 
will analyze the disclosed campaign finance information disseminated 
by the FEC. Third-party enforcers are individuals and entities, apart 
from the FEC and the Department of Justice, that enforce campaign 
finance violations.112 They consist of private citizens, good government 
groups (like CREW), political parties, and campaigns.113  
More often than not, third-party enforcers are themselves political 
actors, meaning those involved in partisan politics, like political parties 
and campaigns.114 The literature on third-party enforcement 
acknowledges, but actually underestimates, the frequency with which 
third-party enforcers are political actors. The literature usually looks 
solely to the reported identity of a complainant to determine the source 
of a complaint.115 Looking solely at the reported identity, however, fails 
to account for the prevalent practice of indirectly filing complaints.116 
For example, political actors may indirectly file by passing along 
complaints to apparently neutral parties to file with the FEC.117  
 
 112. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 113. Cf. Lochner et al., Calculating, Credible, or Both?, supra note 15, at 179 (comparing the 
quality of complaints lodged by different kinds of third-party enforcers).  
 114. See Gross, supra note 71, at 284 (1991) (noting that FEC complaints are filed “often by 
opposing candidates or by the opposing political party”); cf. Lochner et al., Calculating, Credible, 
or Both?, supra note 15 (“Anecdotes . . . suggest that campaign finance monitoring likely is 
conducted by one’s political opponents . . . .” (citations omitted)). Usually, they are political 
researchers, employed by political parties and campaigns to conduct opposition research that is 
then used to make out a case against their opponents. Interview with Samantha McClain, supra 
note 36; Sarah Isgur, How Opposition Research Happens, DISPATCH (Feb. 12, 2020), https://
thedispatch.com/p/how-opposition-research-happens [https://perma.cc/QBW8-Y3P9].  
 115. See Lochner & Cain, Enforcement Blues, supra note 12, at 637 & n.23 (finding that an 
opposition party filed more than half of MURs sampled based alone on the identity of 
complainants). But see Lochner et al., Calculating, Credible, or Both?, supra note 15, at 191 (listing 
the steps taken in their study to attempt to look past the reported identity of the complainant to 
determine the source of a complaint).  
 116. Acknowledging this underestimation and recognizing that third-party enforcers are very 
often political actors allows for a more accurate assessment of the efficacy of third-party 
enforcement.  
 117. Interview with Samantha McClain, supra note 36. The practices of the Democratic 
Congressional Campaign Committee (“DCCC”) provide one telling example. The DCCC has a 
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All types of third-party enforcers, political actors among others, 
analyze disclosure reports to detect campaign finance violations and 
file related complaints. CREW, which filed the complaint against 
Crossroads GPS and which generally “monitors the campaign finance 
activities of those who run for federal office,”118 acknowledged that 
“the FECA-mandated disclosure reports are the only source of 
information CREW can use to determine if an individual or entity is 
complying with the FECA.”119 When analyzing information from these 
reports, third-party enforcers look for discrete violations and trends of 
violations occurring over time.120 They may also compare their analyses 
with those of organizations like the Center for Responsive Politics that 
analyze the same data and publish their analyses online.121 
 
very large in-house research department. See Shira Toeplitz, An Inside Look at the DCCC 
Research Department, ROLL CALL (Apr. 20, 2012, 5:39 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2012/04/20/
an-inside-look-at-the-dccc-research-department [https://perma.cc/6BTM-N5ZF] (“[T]he DCCC 
boasts the largest in-house research department of the four Congressional campaign 
committees.”). In 2018, the DCCC won the House majority partly by focusing on the “culture of 
corruption” of House Republicans and emphasizing their campaign finance violations. See Mike 
DeBonis, National Democrats Start Spending Big Money on Anti-Corruption Message, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 13, 2018, 2:39 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/13/national-
democrats-start-spending-big-money-anti-corruption-message [https://perma.cc/34NU-R6PD] 
(explaining that House Democrats highlighted “scandals,” including the campaign finance 
scandal of Rep. Hunter, in its campaign advertising); Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Rep. Duncan 
D. Hunter and Wife Indicted for Converting Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars in Campaign 
Funds and Falsifying Campaign Finance Records (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdca/pr/rep-duncan-d-hunter-and-wife-indicted-converting-hundreds-thousands-dollars-
campaign [https://perma.cc/HE8B-PXN2] (“U.S. Rep. Duncan D. Hunter and his wife, Margaret 
E. Hunter, were indicted by a federal grand jury today on charges that they converted more than 
$250,000 in campaign funds to pay for personal expenses and filed false campaign finance records 
with the Federal Election Commission.”). FEC complaints alleging campaign finance violations 
thereby bolstered their messaging. While there were several FEC complaints filed against House 
Republicans during the 2018 cycle, the DCCC, its staff, and outside counsel were not listed as 
complainants on any of the complaints filed. Instead, other, neutral parties filed these complaints. 
Interview with Samantha McClain, supra note 36.  
 118. Crossroads GPS Complaint, supra note 1, at 1. 
 119. Id. at 2.  
 120. See Steven D’Amico, Opinion, I Ran Oppo Research Against Donald Trump. He Has No 
Idea What He’s Talking About., POLITICO MAG. (July 15, 2017), https://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2017/07/15/i-ran-oppo-research-against-donald-trump-he-has-no-idea-what-hes-
talking-about-215381 [https://perma.cc/KUF3-ZEZB] (“Public records research and tracking 
opponents’ statements have yielded some of the most memorable opposition research attacks 
over the years. . . . A review of campaign finance disbursements unearthed John Edward’s 
infamous $400 haircut.”).  
 121. Cf. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 224 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“With modern 
technology, disclosure now offers a particularly effective means of arming the voting public with 
information. . . . Reports and databases are available on the FEC’s Web site almost immediately 
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Additionally, third-party enforcers typically have access to research 
subscriptions, which are useful, though imperfect, tools to develop 
incomplete data reported to the FEC.122  
After a third-party enforcer detects a campaign finance violation, 
the third-party enforcer will enforce the campaign finance violation 
informally or formally.123 Informally, they “enforce” campaign finance 
law by publicizing alleged campaign finance violations, potentially 
prompting formal enforcement, in the hopes of punishing violators at 
the polls.124 To do so, the third-party enforcer will prepare a research 
document that explains the alleged campaign finance violation to a lay 
audience, along with support from the public record to substantiate the 
claim.125 The third-party enforcer will then pitch the story to a 
journalist in the hopes of prompting news coverage of the violation, 
purchase advertising, or otherwise draw attention to the transgression 
in order to influence voters.126 Formally, third-party enforcers generate 
complaints that they file directly or indirectly with the FEC. The third-
party enforcer will write a complaint, translating the same information 
that would be provided to a journalist for consideration by the FEC.127 
 
after they are filed, supplemented by private entities such as OpenSecrets.org and 
FollowTheMoney.org.”).  
 122. Cf. Hilary Krieger, An Introduction to the Dark Arts of Opposition Research, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 31, 2017, 10:56 AM), http://53eig.ht/2ieztyb [https://perma.cc/9ZQX-
4A4J] (explaining that the research process often begins with “an exhaustive Lexis Nexis 
search”).  
 123. Lochner & Cain, Enforcement Blues, supra note 12, at 630.  
 124. Cf. id. at 630, 651–53 (“[C]ampaign enforcement relies upon the informal sanctions of 
public opinion; those who break the law not only face the prospect of fines if found guilty, but 
they also may suffer at the polls as a result of public reaction to their infraction.”); Gaskins et al., 
From the FEC to the Ballot Box, supra note 22, at 1026–27 (finding that a voter’s perception of a 
candidate changed when the voter was confronted with news stories about a candidate’s campaign 
finance violations).  
 125. Interview with Samantha McClain, supra note 36; see also Isgur, supra note 114 
(“[Researchers] put together a ‘book’ . . . A researcher will start by cataloging everything the 
opponent has said . . . . Every public record that can be found . . . will be used to find 
contradictions and inconsistencies.”).  
 126. Interview with Samantha McClain, supra note 36; see Isgur, supra note 114 (“Once the 
book is put to bed, it gets handed off to the communications team to get it out there. . . . And the 
information in the book can end up a lot of places: television ads, debate preparation, speeches, 
direct mail, and—of course—news stories.”). Most researchers will not personally pitch the piece, 
rather they will assist a communications specialist, who will do the talking. Interview with 
Samantha McClain, supra note 36.  
 127. Interview with Samantha McClain, supra note 36. Third-party enforcers may hire 
attorneys to write and file their complaints. Id. 
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Then, the FEC formally enforces campaign finance law through 
administrative and civil penalties.128  
Moreover, contemporary third-party enforcers have ready access 
to reliable campaign finance information. Third-party enforcers rely 
upon this disclosed campaign finance information to identify and call 
attention to serious campaign finance violations.  
C. Third-Party Enforcement at the FEC in the Literature 
Despite third-party enforcers’ increased access to reliable 
campaign finance information, the scholarly sentiment towards third-
party enforcement is lukewarm at best. Third-party enforcement is 
generally seen as a necessary evil. Third-party enforcement is 
“necessary” because of the resource constraints of regulators.129 To 
effectively regulate, a regulatory agency must simultaneously monitor, 
investigate, and enforce—a task that requires a “larger, better trained 
staff” and “larger budget” than is often available.130 Third-party 
enforcement is an efficient way to deploy the limited “time, knowledge, 
and money” of a regulatory agency.131  
Third-party enforcement is deemed a necessary evil, though, 
because it can lead to unreasonable regulatory outcomes. Scholars 
argue that regulation is unreasonable whenever “compliance would 
entail costs that clearly exceed the resulting social benefits.”132 Third-
party enforcement may promote regulatory unreasonableness because 
it “can tie up inspectors on legally unfounded or substantively trivial 
claims.”133 When inspectors are tied up with trivial violations, they 
 
 128. See FEC, GUIDEBOOK 2012, supra note 8, at 5 (“With the limited exception of the 
Administrative Fine program . . . , the Commission does not impose fines for violations of the 
campaign finance laws. Rather, the Commission seeks the payment of civil penalties through 
voluntary settlements (called conciliation agreements) with respondents.”). While informal and 
formal enforcement go hand in hand, this Note focuses primarily on formal enforcement.  
 129. See Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff, supra note 11 (“[B]ecause most of the time agency 
officials are significantly outnumbered by the groups they regulate, resource constraints affect 
their ability to monitor, investigate, and enforce the law.”).  
 130. Id.; BARDACH & KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK, supra note 12, at 161.  
 131. See BARDACH & KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK, supra note 12, at 160, 165–66 (“No 
matter how intimidating an agency’s armory of sanctions, the question always remains of where 
and how to deploy inspectorial resources. . . . [C]omplainants can be a valuable extension of the 
inspectorate’s capacity for gathering information about actual or potential harms.”). 
 132. Id. at 6. Regulators, instead, should strive to punish violations associated with serious 
social harms and forbear punishment of trivial violations. Id. 
 133. Id. at 166.  
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cannot pursue more serious violations.134 Consequently, third-party 
enforcement in theory skews the enforcement agenda of a regulatory 
agency toward unreasonableness.  
Previous studies of third-party enforcement at the FEC 
specifically are consistent with this theory and portray the practice as a 
structural deficiency, hindering enforcement at the FEC.135 In 1999, 
before the FEC implemented the Administrative Fine and ADR 
processes, one study found that third-party-generated MURs 
“accounted for just over 88% of all claims resulting in a ‘No Reason to 
Believe’ disposition.”136 From this finding, the authors claimed that 
third-party enforcement skews the enforcement agenda of the FEC 
toward trivial violations.137  
Even after the FEC implemented the Administrative Fine and 
ADR processes, institutional mechanisms to contend with the third-
party-enforcement skew,138 studies still found that third-party 
enforcement hindered enforcement at the FEC. In 2008, Todd Lochner 
and his co-authors analyzed MURs from 1999 to 2004, finding that 
third-party enforcement “greatly reduces the ability of the agency to 
filter out insignificant claims,” even after implementation of the 
Administrative Fine and ADR processes.139 Further, they postulated 
that these alternative processes may even incentivize more complaints 
concerning trivial violations because, unlike prior to the 
implementation of these process, these trivial violations could now lead 
to fines, rather than outright dismissal.140  
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Lochner and Cain studied third-party enforcement at the FEC in 1991 and 1993. Lochner 
& Cain, Equity and Efficacy, supra note 21, at 1909. Lochner et al. studied third-party 
enforcement from 1999 to 2004. Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff, supra note 11, at 216. Michael 
Franz also studied third-party enforcement from 1996 to 2004. Franz, supra note 19, at 173. 
Lochner et al. studied third-party enforcement from 2006 to 2012. Lochner et al., Calculating, 
Credible, or Both?, supra note 15, at 179.  
 136. Lochner & Cain, Equity and Efficacy, supra note 21, at 1920.  
 137. Id. at 1935. 
 138. See Franz, supra note 19, at 172 (recounting how the FEC implemented both the 
Administrative Fine and ADR processes to quickly dispose of minor campaign finance 
violations).  
 139. Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff, supra note 11, at 230. 
 140. See id. (“To the extent that these new programs increased the investigation and sanction 
of low-level offenses (which they did), they created additional incentives for regulated groups to 
report one another – and generated more complaints that . . . focus the FEC’s attention on 
obvious infractions typically discovered by third-party monitoring.”). But see Franz, supra note 
19 (finding that efficiency at the FEC improved with implementation of the Administrative Fine 
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Finally, after a long gap in the literature, in 2020, a new study 
presented a less negative assessment of third-party enforcement at the 
FEC. Lochner, writing with new co-authors, published a study of third-
party enforcement from 2006 to 2012, seeking to determine whether 
some third-party enforcers file more veracious and serious complaints 
than others.141 A complaint was coded as veracious if the FEC found 
that there was a “Reason to Believe” that a campaign finance violation 
had occurred.142 A complaint was coded as trivial if it was ultimately 
“dismissed or result[ed] in fines less than $1,000.”143 The study found 
that repeat players, like “parties, interest groups, and incumbent 
campaigns,”144 “lodge somewhat higher quality complaints than 
unaffiliated individuals or challenger campaigns,” as these third-party 
enforcers were more likely to file veracious complaints and less likely 
to file trivial complaints.145  
Even though Lochner et al. determined that some third-party 
enforcers are better than others, they continued to malign third-party 
enforcement at the FEC overall. The study concluded, like the 
previous studies on third-party enforcement, that third-party enforcers 
“are no substitute for an adequately funded agency with independent 
investigative authority,”146 and they went so far as to refer to the most 
successful of third-party enforcers as “the best house in a bad 
neighborhood.”147 Accordingly, it could seem as though all hope is lost 
for effective enforcement of federal campaign finance violations, but, 
for the reasons discussed below, this conclusion is incorrect.  
 
and ADR processes but acknowledging that “politically motivated complaints” continued to 
reduce the efficiency of enforcement at the FEC). 
 141. Lochner et al., Calculating, Credible, or Both?, supra note 15, at 179. 
 142. See id. at 190 (“For veracity, our aim is to measure whether an alleged violation in fact 
took place. Given the potentially political nature of FEC enforcement, however, this concept is 
illusive to capture. Our best approximation is . . . the Office of General Counsel’s ‘Reason to 
Believe’ (RTB) designation.”).  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 179.  
 145. Id. at 179, 191–92.  
 146. Id. at 195.  
 147. Id. at 194.  
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D. Flawed Assumptions of the Previous Studies on Third-Party 
Enforcement  
The previous studies on third-party enforcement at the FEC relied 
upon flawed assumptions that negatively portray the practice and 
almost entirely ignore its benefits. This Section will address each of the 
following assumptions in turn: (1) the FEC reaches the “right” 
conclusion; (2) the “right” conclusion is the legally correct conclusion; 
and (3) third-party enforcement is successful only when enforcers 
reach the “right” conclusion.  
First, studies on third-party enforcement relied upon the flawed 
assumption that the FEC is an impartial arbiter that reaches the “right” 
conclusion on any given enforcement matter.148 The FEC often avoids 
reaching conclusions, let alone the correct legal conclusion, because it 
dismisses meritorious complaints within their prosecutorial 
discretion.149 The literature ignores this point when evaluating third-
party-generated matters relative to internally generated matters. For 
example, in one study, Lochner et al. coded cases that were “dismissed 
or result[ed] in fines less than $1,000” as trivial.150 This study then 
determined that the FEC detects more serious campaign finance 
violations than third-party enforcers because internally generated 
MURs result in fines 62 percent of the time, while third-party-
generated MURs result in fines less than 10 percent of the time.151 As 
explained in Part I.A, the FEC dismisses “low-rated” MURs under the 
EPS, a confidential system that includes FEC “priorities” as a plus-
factor.152 Naturally, internally generated matters are going to be 
 
 148. While outside of the scope of this Note, it should also be noted that the FEC is a political 
body with a partisan split. See Leadership and Structure, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/about/
leadership-and-structure [https://perma.cc/N2HE-2PK5] (“Commissioners are appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate. . . . [N]o more than three Commissioners can represent 
the same political party . . . .”). Consequently, it may not reach the “right” conclusion on 
enforcement matters because of political influences. See OFF. OF COMM’R ANN M. RAVEL, supra 
note 32 (claiming that the FEC is not performing properly because of obstruction by a bloc of 
three Commissioners on account of their ideological opposition to campaign finance law).  
 149. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FEC, 10 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43 (D.D.C. 1998), rev’d, 180 F.3d 277 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (“In the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion, the Commission relies on its 
Enforcement Priority System and is forced to dismiss dozens of administrative complaints each 
year without ever having the opportunity to investigate their allegations.”). 
 150. Lochner et al., Calculating, Credible, or Both?, supra note 15, at 190.  
 151. Id. at 185. 
 152. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.  
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dismissed less frequently than third-party-generated matters when part 
of their evaluation is alignment with internal priorities.  
Further, some campaign finance violations that lead to fines of 
more than $1,000 are trivial. As mentioned in Part I.A, the 
Administrative Fine process imposes “automatic ‘parking ticket’ fines” 
for filing offenses.153 These parking tickets can quickly add up to more 
than $1,000. For example, candidate committees that have to file 48-
Hour Notices are charged $146 for each late notice they file, “plus 10% 
of the dollar amount of the contributions not timely reported.”154 At 
this rate, two untimely reported contributions from political action 
committees could meet the $1,000 threshold.155 Moreover, “[s]eventy-
four percent of FEC-initiated cases originate from . . . Administrative 
Fines,”156 so it is likely that many internally generated matters that 
result in fines over $1,000 are filing violations. These filing offenses are 
the most trivial of campaign finance violations and the least important 
to voters.157 
For these reasons, a complaint that is “dismissed or result[ed] in 
fines less than $1,000” is not necessarily trivial, and a complaint that 
results in fines more than $1,000 could very well be trivial. Thus, 
assuming that the FEC reaches the correct conclusion in dismissing 
cases and doling out fines leads to erroneous conclusions about the 
efficacy of third-party enforcement relative to internally generated 
enforcement.  
Second, the previous studies relied upon the flawed assumption 
that a complaint is trivial unless it reaches the correct legal 
conclusion.158 A third-party complaint can allege a serious campaign 
finance violation and simultaneously be wrong as a matter of law. 
 
 153. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
 154. Calculating Administrative Fines, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/
enforcement/administrative-fines/calculating-administrative-fines [https://perma.cc/4SE9-87GE]. 
Further, the penalty “increases by 25% for each time a prior fine was assessed under the 
Administrative Fine Program during the current and previous two-year election cycles.” Id.  
 155. See Contribution Limits, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/
candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-limits [https://perma.cc/4ZBX-S42W] (indicating that 
multicandidate political action committees and party committees could contribute $5,000 per 
election to candidate committees during the 2020 election cycle). 
 156. Lochner et al., Calculating, Credible, or Both?, supra note 15, at 183. 
 157. See Gaskins et al., From the FEC to the Ballot Box, supra note 22, at 1016 (“The sole 
exception—unsurprisingly, because it is a minor offense—was that accusations of late filing did 
not appreciably affect vote intentions.”). 
 158. See supra notes 141–142 and accompanying text.  
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Crossroads GPS provides such an example. At the time CREW alleged 
that Crossroads GPS had violated campaign finance law by failing to 
disclose its $3 million mystery donor, the FEC interpreted the FECA 
in a way that insulated Crossroads GPS from having to disclose the 
mystery donor.159 Therefore, CREW’s legal argument was technically 
wrong, until the District of Columbia Circuit reversed course.160 Within 
the fluid and contested legal landscape of campaign finance law,161 
assuming that an FEC complaint that reaches the purportedly wrong 
legal conclusion is frivolous obscures the actual rate of meritorious 
complaints and fails to account for complaints that are filed to 
challenge campaign finance law.  
Third, and last, the previous studies also relied upon the flawed 
assumption that the success of third-party enforcement depends wholly 
upon formal enforcement outcomes. Third-party enforcers are often 
referred to simply as third-party monitors in scholarship because they 
“may only take note of legal or ethical infractions . . . . They neither 
make rules nor unilaterally impose costs on wrongdoers.”162 This 
definition applies when one commonly conceptualizes costs outside of 
the political context. But when one conceptualizes costs within this 
context, third-party enforcers clearly impose costs on violators through 
informal and formal enforcement alike. 
 
 159. See supra notes 23–24. In assessing CREW’s complaint, the FEC reported that 
the record reflects that an unnamed individual contributed to Crossroads in 
furtherance of Crossroads’ effort to support a clearly identified federal candidate. 
Nonetheless, because the relevant information does not reasonably suggest that the 
donor made a contribution “for the purpose of furthering the reported independent 
expenditure,” it does not appear that Crossroads was required to identify that 
contributor on its relevant independent expenditure report or reports under the 
applicable Commission regulation. 
First Gen. Couns.’s Rep. at 2, Crossroads Grassroots Pol’y Strategies, MUR 6696 (FEC Mar. 7, 
2014), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6696/15044385153.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY7R-BDSM]. 
 160. See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC (Crossroads GPS), 971 F.3d 340, 343 
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (“CREW then brought this action in the district court, seeking to have the Rule’s 
circumscribed disclosure mandate declared invalid as inconsistent with the statute. The district 
court agreed with CREW . . . . We read the statute the same way and thus affirm the district 
court’s decision.”).  
 161. Cf. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Strikes Down Limits on Federal Campaign 
Donations, Wash. Post (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-
strikes-down-limits-on-federal-campaign-donations/2014/04/02/54e16c30-ba74-11e3-9a05-c739f2 
9ccb08_story.html [https://perma.cc/DY6N-JPG9] (“The Supreme Court’s divisive decision 
Wednesday striking down a Watergate-era limit on campaign contributions was the latest 
milestone for conservative justices who are disassembling a campaign finance regime they feel 
violates free-speech rights.”).  
 162. E.g., Lochner et al., Calculating, Credible, or Both?, supra note 15. 
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When a politically motivated third-party enforcer files an FEC 
complaint,163 the third-party enforcer is seeking formal enforcement, 
and an FEC fine would be an advantageous outcome. But an FEC fine, 
in and of itself, is often not the primary outcome sought.164 Instead, the 
desired outcome is publicity, ideally in the form of a front-page news 
story and a headline about the alleged campaign finance violation.165 
The third-party enforcer can then use the story in television and digital 
advertising to influence voters.166 Formal enforcement is relevant to the 
extent that it makes the campaign finance violation alleged more 
newsworthy and, therefore, more likely to garner that desired front-
page news story.167 Should a third-party enforcer find success in 
pitching their news story and running their advertisements, forcing 
violators to address and counter these messages can be much more 
costly, in both a monetary and political sense, than an FEC fine.168  
Moreover, whether one agrees or disagrees with the assumptions 
made in the previous studies on third-party enforcement, most of these 
 
 163. Third-party enforcers are often political actors. See supra Part II.B. 
 164. This point is especially true given the long timelines for formal enforcement. See FEC 
Memorandum on the Status of Enforcement, supra note 80 (reporting that cases took on average 
530 days in fiscal year 2020). Often, formal enforcement comes long after the completion of the 
election cycle when the alleged violation occurred. Gross, supra note 71, at 286. 
 165. See Crossroads GPS Complaint, supra note 1, at 2 (“Publicizing campaign finance 
violations and filing complaints with the FEC serves CREW’s mission of keeping the public 
informed about individuals and entities that violate campaign finance laws and deterring future 
violations of campaign finance law.”); cf. ALAN HUFFMAN & MICHAEL REJEBIAN, WE’RE WITH 
NOBODY 9 (2012) (explaining that opposition research, “when significant, . . . form[s] the basis 
for poll questions, news conferences, direct mail pieces or TV ads”).  
 166. Cf. R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44319, THE FEDERAL ELECTION 
COMMISSION: ENFORCEMENT PROCESS AND SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 6 (2015) 
(“[C]ampaigns and other political actors routinely publicize complaints they have filed . . . .”). 
 167. See Gaskins et al., From the FEC to the Ballot Box, supra note 22, at 1001 (acknowledging 
that the media does not cover campaign finance violations evenly in that the “media are more 
likely to cover campaign finance impropriety in more high-profile cases and when the violation is 
more severe”).  
 168. For example, U.S. Senate candidate Theresa Greenfield imposed costs on Senator Joni 
Ernst by running advertisements, highlighting that “Ernst was caught knowingly accepting illegal 
contributions from corporations.” See Molly Duffy, Fact Checker: Theresa Greenfield Blasts Joni 
Ernst over ‘Illegal Contributions’, GAZETTE (July 27, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://
www.thegazette.com/campaigns-elections/fact-checker-theresa-greenfield-blasts-joni-ernst-over-
illegal-contributions [https://perma.cc/QAB8-JP77]. Ernst and outside groups supporting Ernst 
spent incredible sums to counter this messaging in a very competitive Senate race. See Erin 
Murphy, U.S. Senate Race Sets $234 Million Record in Iowa, GAZETTE (Nov. 1, 2020, 5:45 AM), 
https://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/government/greenfield-ernst-senate-money-election-
20201101 [https://perma.cc/29ZL-RBKS]. 
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studies are dated.169 In the contemporary context, the practice of third-
party enforcement differs significantly from its previous iterations 
because both the enforcement context and the practices of third-party 
enforcers have changed over time. As will be seen in Part III, in the 
contemporary enforcement context, third-party enforcement plays a 
significant and beneficial role in enforcing campaign finance violations. 
III.  THIRD-PARTY ENFORCEMENT ADVANCES FAIR ELECTIONS 
In addition to relying upon flawed assumptions, the previous 
studies on third-party enforcement overlook some of the drawbacks 
and many of the benefits of the practice in the contemporary 
enforcement context. At present, the regulatory stakes have never 
been higher for the FEC. This is clear from the record high rate of 
political spending seen in the 2020 election cycle.170 But, at the same 
time, the FEC fails to adequately enforce campaign finance law, and 
third-party enforcers fill the resulting enforcement void. In light of this 
context, this Part first outlines some of the potential drawbacks of 
third-party enforcement. Then it shows that the positives of third-party 
enforcement outweigh these issues and ultimately promote fair 
elections because, at the end of the day, third-party enforcement is a 
much more forceful deterrent of campaign finance violations than 
internally generated enforcement. 
A. Drawbacks of Contemporary Third-Party Enforcement 
The highly critical literature on third-party enforcement at the 
FEC focuses on the drawbacks of the practice. Before outlining the 
overlooked benefits of third-party enforcement, this Section outlines 
two commonly overlooked drawbacks of the practice. First, this 
Section explains how third-party enforcers enforce campaign finance 
violations unevenly, a significant, overlooked criticism of the practice. 
Second, this Section notes how opposition to disclosure could make 
headway, a real threat to the efficacy of the practice.  
 
 169. See supra note 135 (Equity and Efficacy in the Enforcement of Campaign Finance Laws 
was published twenty-two years ago; Wheat from Chaff: Third-Party Monitoring and FEC 
Enforcement Actions was published thirteen years ago; The Devil We Know? Evaluating the 
Federal Election Commission as Enforcer was published twelve years ago; but Calculating, 
Credible, or Both? Third-Party Monitors and Repeat Players in Federal Campaign Finance 
Enforcement was published just a year ago). 
 170. Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 31. 
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1. An Overlooked Criticism: Uneven Enforcement.  Third-party 
enforcers enforce campaign finance violations unevenly in both 
predictable and unpredictable ways in the contemporary enforcement 
context. First, limits on investigative tools produce predictable 
underenforcement of certain campaign finance violations and political 
actors. For example, third-party enforcers struggle to enforce 
campaign finance violations that cannot be proven through 
information in the public record.171 Thus, some campaign finance 
violations, like the prohibition against personal use of campaign 
funds,172 will go underenforced or unenforced informally and formally.  
Just as some campaign finance violations are underenforced, some 
political actors may be undermonitored. Enforcing campaign finance 
violations can be expensive.173 Generally, it requires political actors to 
pay full-time researchers to devote their time and energy to learn about 
campaign finance law and to monitor potential violators.174 The most 
successful researchers also usually have access to paid research 
subscriptions to aid their pursuits.175 If researchers spot a campaign 
finance violation, their political employers may want to hire attorneys 
to write the related FEC complaint and review the advertisements 
publicizing the complaint.176 In this way, political actors must raise and 
spend campaign funds to enforce campaign finance violations, which 
could prevent underfunded political actors from effectively monitoring 
and publicizing the political spending of better funded opponents.  
Second, political motivations may cause third-party enforcers to 
enforce campaign finance violations in unpredictable ways. Politically 
motivated third-party enforcers want to enforce campaign finance law 
in order to win elections. This poses a problem for the efficacy of third-
party enforcement because while enforcing the campaign finance 
violations of one’s opponent is often conducive to winning an election, 
sometimes it is not. Enforcing campaign finance violations of an 
 
 171. Interview with Samantha McClain, supra note 36. 
 172. See A.P. Dillon, Cal Cunningham Now Facing FEC Complaint in Addition to Military 
Investigations, N. STATE J. (Oct. 14, 2020), https://nsjonline.com/article/2020/10/cal-cunningham-
now-facing-fec-complaint-in-addition-to-military-investigations [https://perma.cc/NZ25-943S] 
(discussing an FEC complaint against a U.S. Senate candidate where the legal issue turned on 
whether the travel expenses paid by the campaign were for campaign or purely personal activity).  
 173. See HUFFMAN & REJEBIAN, supra note 165, at 27 (“Opposition research can be 
expensive—tens of thousands for a congressional campaign or hundreds of thousands of dollars 
for a presidential campaign—which is why it’s most often used in big-ticket races.”). 
 174. See supra note 117 and accompanying text for an example of a research department.  
 175. See supra note 114. 
 176. Interview with Samantha McClain, supra note 36. 
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opponent may be disadvantageous when it could distract from a more 
compelling media narrative or when it could backfire, encouraging an 
opponent to investigate one’s own campaign finance violations. In 
these instances, third-party enforcers may refrain from enforcing 
detected campaign finance violations. Therefore, because third-party 
enforcers enforce campaign finance violations unevenly, third-party 
enforcement fails to meet the ideal of entirely neutral internal 
enforcement, even though third-party enforcers have access to reliable 
campaign finance information at present.  
2. An Impending Pitfall? Opposition to Disclosure.  Looking 
forward, opposition to disclosure could make headway in light of the 
amplified effects of disclosure law and a changing Court.177 
Technological advancements, including electronic filing and online 
disclosure, have amplified the effects of disclosure law.178 Some argue 
that “the easy online availability of disclosed campaign finance 
information . . . heightens concerns about the potential for disclosure 
to chill constitutionally protected speech.”179  
Compelled by freedom of speech and privacy concerns, some 
scholars and jurists have even called for limiting or eliminating 
disclosure requirements.180 If disclosure requirements are limited or 
eliminated, third-party enforcers would be stripped of the information 
that they rely upon to enforce campaign finance violations.181 Limiting 
disclosure requirements would likely lead to substantively worse third-
party enforcement; eliminating disclosure requirements would likely 
decimate third-party enforcement. Consequently, rising opposition to 
disclosure law is a real threat to the efficacy of third-party enforcement. 
 
 177. The Court has not considered a disclosure law case since the appointments of Justices 
Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett.  
 178. See supra Part II. 
 179. See Briffault, supra note 92, at 274; see also McGeveran, supra note 111, at 7 (“If 
unthinking support for disclosure is widespread, silence about its privacy costs is nearly 
universal.”). 
 180. See Briffault, supra note 92, at 295–303 (delineating alternatives to contemporary 
disclosure law, including “The Anonymity Alternative” and other reforms that would roll back 
disclosure requirements); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 482–83 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“The success of . . . intimidation tactics has apparently spawned a cottage industry 
that uses forcibly disclosed donor information to pre-empt citizens’ exercise of their First 
Amendment rights. . . . These instances of retaliation sufficiently demonstrate why this Court 
should invalidate mandatory disclosure and reporting requirements.”).  
 181. See supra Part II.B. 
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B. Overlooked Benefits of Contemporary Third-Party Enforcement 
That being said, in the contemporary enforcement context, the 
benefits of third-party enforcement outweigh these drawbacks. Third-
party enforcement is ultimately beneficial for the pursuit of fair 
elections. Presently, “few FEC-initiated cases are ultimately decided in 
the MUR program . . . whereas this is the most common venue for the 
enforcement of third-party-initiated allegations.”182 While it is difficult 
to measure accurately the rate of serious third-party-generated 
complaints, the rate of third-party-generated MURs far outpaces 
internally generated MURs.183 As the MUR process handles the most 
serious campaign finance violations, third-party enforcers are likely 
pursuing serious campaign finance violations.184  
Third-party enforcers are motivated to pursue more serious 
campaign finance violations to respond to public demand. A common 
concern about disclosure requirements is that they “end up compelling 
the disclosure of information that most of the public do not care about 
very much.”185 As explained in Part II, third-party enforcers are often 
political actors, conducting opposition research to campaign against 
their opponents. Their ultimate goal is to win elections, so these third-
party enforcers focus on issues that the electorate cares most about.186 
While third-party enforcers enforce campaign finance violations 
unevenly, these third-party enforcers are at least actively trying to 
publicize the kinds of campaign finance violations that voters care 
about. Therefore, third-party enforcers serve an important filtering 
role that the FEC does not (because the FEC cannot disclose 
information about an enforcement matter until it is closed187), and 
some uneven third-party enforcement may be attributable to public 
demand.  
Most importantly, the threat of enforcement by the FEC, unlike 
in the past, is no longer an effective deterrent of campaign finance 
violations. The FEC is initiating fewer and fewer MURs each year, as 
 
 182. Lochner et al., Calculating, Credible, or Both?, supra note 15, at 184. 
 183. See supra Part I.B.  
 184. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 185. BARDACH & KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK, supra note 12, at 249.  
 186. Cf. Isgur, supra note 114 (quoting a “former Republican operative” who said 
“[m]aximum impact” is the “[m]ost important consideration” in determining how to utilize 
opposition research).  
 187. Lochner et al., Calculating, Credible, or Both?, supra note 15.  
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shown in Part I.B. “[I]t is impossible to account for the underlying 
incidence of campaign finance violations that occur,”188 but political 
actors are likely violating campaign finance law at a rate consistent with 
or maybe even higher than historical trends due to recent 
unprecedented political spending.189 At the same time, the FEC is not 
detecting and enforcing these violations. It is overwhelmingly unlikely 
that the FEC will investigate a given political actor, and political actors 
know this.190 Consequently, the forceful deterrent of the threat of 
detection is almost entirely lacking at the FEC,191 while third-party 
enforcement, though predictably and unpredictably uneven, is a real 
threat. 
Because the threat of FEC enforcement is diminished, politically 
motivated third-party enforcers surely do not have to file “frivolous” 
complaints to misdirect the FEC. Previous studies suggest that since 
“an hour of the FEC’s time spent on dealing with a frivolous complaint 
against an opponent means one less hour they can spend investigating 
you,” politically motivated third-party enforcers file “frivolous” 
complaints to misdirect the FEC.192 In the contemporary context, 
though, it would be a waste of time for the third-party enforcers to 
misdirect the FEC with “frivolous” complaints, given that the FEC 
initiates so few enforcement proceedings anyway.193 Further, even if 
the previous studies are correct and third-party enforcers file some 
“frivolous” complaints, the FEC uses its prosecutorial discretion to 
dismiss these complaints, and, unlike in the past, the Administrative 
Fine and ADR processes can dispose of these complaints.194  
 
 188. Id. at 187. 
 189. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.  
 190. Cf. Gaskins et al., From the FEC to the Ballot Box, supra note 22, at 1005 (“[A]lmost no 
one believes that the FEC at present credibly deters would-be violators.”). For example, the FEC 
has not found probable cause of a violation of coordination laws since the Citizens United decision 
in 2010. FEC, RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION 
24 (May 1, 2019), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/FEC_Response_to_
House_Admin.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPG5-L8P2]. Therefore, a political actor does not need to 
worry about the FEC enforcing coordination laws against them.  
 191. See, e.g., Lochner et al., Wheat from Chaff, supra note 11, at 218 (“[T]he probability of 
detection can be more important in deterring legal violations than the probability or severity of 
sanction.” (citation omitted)).  
 192. Lochner et al., Calculating, Credible, or Both?, supra note 15, at 182–83. 
 193. But see Gaskins et al., From the FEC to the Ballot Box, supra note 22, at 1027 (“[I]f an 
allegation and a conviction are synonymous in the eyes of the voters, there are strong incentives 
to bring overzealous and possibly frivolous accusations against one’s political opponents.”).  
 194. See supra Part I.A.I. 
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Moreover, the FEC appears unwilling or unable to enforce the 
law. Third-party enforcers, in contrast, pursue serious campaign 
violations because they have the tools and motivation to do so.195 While 
third-party enforcement is “no substitute for an adequately funded 
agency with independent investigative authority,”196 at present, it is the 
primary deterrent against violating campaign finance law. The FEC 
rarely detects and enforces campaign finance violations; third-party 
enforcers detect and enforce, albeit unevenly. Therefore, while third-
party enforcement is imperfect, contemporary third-party enforcement 
advances the pursuit of fair federal elections. And it will likely continue 
to do so, unless the Court or Congress limits or eliminates disclosure 
law. With that potential pitfall in mind, third-party enforcement is 
beneficial to the enforcement of campaign finance law overall in the 
contemporary enforcement context.  
IV.  PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE ENFORCEMENT AT THE FEC 
Not only does third-party enforcement advance fair elections, but 
it also highlights ways in which the FEC can improve its enforcement 
processes and strive for fairer elections. The FEC should capitalize on 
the benefits of third-party enforcement. To do so, the General Counsel 
of the FEC should alter its EPS.197 The General Counsel “rates all 
incoming cases against objective criteria” supplied by the EPS.198 
MURs with high ratings are investigated; MURs with low ratings are 
dismissed.199 Since the FEC utilizes the EPS as part of its prosecutorial 
discretion,200 ensuring that the General Counsel changes the EPS may 
require an executive or congressional mandate.201 Whether mandated 
to do so or not, the General Counsel should alter their EPS in two ways. 
First, third-party complaints should be rated according to their use of 
evidence in the public record. Second, alleged campaign finance 
 
 195. See supra Part II.  
 196. Lochner et al., Calculating, Credible, or Both?, supra note 15, at 195. 
 197. See FEC, GUIDEBOOK 2012, supra note 8, at 11 (“[The Office of General Counsel] 
evaluates the complaint and response, if any, using objective criteria approved by the Commission 
under its Enforcement Priority System.”).  
 198. Press Release, FEC, Compliance Cases Made Public, supra note 53. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  
 201. Since the EPS is confidential, supra note 50, the public will only know of alterations to 
the EPS if there is an executive or congressional mandate calling for an alteration, or if the FEC 
discloses relevant information.  
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violations that implicate new campaign technologies should be more 
highly rated. The commissioners will have to approve these alterations 
and may seek public comment on them.202  
First, at the outset, the General Counsel should consider whether 
a third-party complaint can be substantiated by information in the 
public record when rating a complaint under the EPS. “Frivolous” 
complaints are presumably based upon bad evidence or no evidence at 
all, while meritorious complaints are based on information in the public 
record. As a preliminary matter then, the General Counsel should rate 
a third-party complaint according to its use of evidence in the public 
record,203 rating a complaint higher based upon the quantity and quality 
of such evidence.204 In reviewing a complaint, the General Counsel 
should ask: is this the kind of information that the complainant would 
be able to find online (or elsewhere)? If the answer is yes, then this 
would weigh in favor of investigating the complaint. While some 
serious campaign finance violations cannot be proven based upon the 
public record alone,205 this alteration to the EPS would fast-track 
 
 202. The FEC has “broad discretion to determine how to proceed with respect to complaints.” 
Statement of Policy Regarding Commission Action in Matters at the Initial Stage in the 
Enforcement Process, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,545, 12,545 (Mar. 16, 2007). The EPS is an exercise of this 
discretion, see id. at 12,545–46, and the FEC can alter the EPS as it sees fit, cf. FEC, GUIDEBOOK 
2012, supra note 8, at 11 (noting that the EPS’s “objective criteria [are] approved by the 
Commission”). In 2003 and 2008, the FEC chose to seek public comment on alterations to the 
objective criteria considered under the EPS. See Enforcement Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,311, 
23,314 (May 1, 2003) (“Should the Commission give lesser or greater priority to cases that require 
complex investigations and/or raise issues where there is little consensus . . . ? Since cases 
involving these issues often involve large amounts of spending, . . . should these be the cases given 
high priority?”); Agency Procedures, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,494, 74,498 (Dec. 8, 2008) (same).  
 203. The FEC has used a similar approach to filter out other kinds of complaints categorically. 
In 2001, the General Counsel proposed altering the EPS and the Public Financing Enforcement 
Priority System to allow for “quickly disposing of matters clearly falling within the media 
exemption regulations.” Memorandum from Lois G. Lerner, Acting Gen. Couns., FEC, to FEC 
on Modifications to the Enforcement Priority System and Public Financing Enforcement Priority 
System for Media Exemption Cases (Jan. 26, 2001), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/
documents/letter_to_Committee_on_House_Administration_July_25_2013.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JDN4-2TK5]. The General Counsel proposed categorizing complaints that “clearly” 
fell within the media exemption to be identified under “Category A. Initial Considerations - 
Preliminary” and to be “included in the next case closing report” before further EPS ranking. Id. 
The method proposed here would maintain a rating system, rather than a categorical approach. 
 204. Third-party enforcers monitor, build, and substantiate campaign finance complaints with 
information from common research subscriptions and services (OpenSecrets.org, Political 
MoneyLine, LexisNexis, among many others) that are less reliable than public records. See supra 
note 122 and accompanying text. For this reason, the rating system should account for the quality, 
as well as the quantity, of substantiation.  
 205. See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text.  
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meritorious complaints, with the added benefit of sifting out 
“frivolous” third-party complaints.  
Second, the General Counsel should weigh the implication of new 
technologies, like digital advertising, as an objective criterion under the 
EPS. Political spending on digital advertising is skyrocketing.206 In 
2012, digital advertising comprised just 1.4 percent of all political 
spending, at around $159 million.207 In 2016, digital advertising 
comprised 14 percent of all political spending, at around $1.4 billion.208 
As this trend will likely continue, and assuming that more campaign 
spending leads to more campaign finance violations, the FEC should 
shift its attention to this next frontier.209  
To do so, the General Counsel should rate a complaint that 
involves new technologies more highly under the EPS. This alteration 
to the EPS capitalizes on third-party enforcement, as third-party 
enforcers are more knowledgeable about new technologies and, 
therefore, more likely to detect campaign finance violations involving 
new technologies than the FEC.210 The FEC should investigate these 
matters in order to familiarize itself with the issues arising in new 
technologies and to increase its efficiency over the long run, preparing 
for a future political landscape where even more political spending is 
directed toward new campaign technologies.  
Moreover, these are just two examples of how the FEC can alter 
the EPS to capitalize on the benefits of third-party enforcement. These 
simple and noncontroversial alterations could improve the efficacy and 
efficiency of FEC enforcement overall.  
CONCLUSION 
During the 2020 election cycle, when there was unprecedented 
political spending on federal campaigns, enforcement at the FEC was, 
 
 206. See Erika Franklin Fowler, Michael M. Franz & Travis N. Ridout, Online Political 
Advertising in the United States, in SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY 128 (Nathaniel Persily & 
Joshua A. Tucker eds., 2020) (documenting that in 2018, digital spending accounted for more than 
20 percent of all political ad spending).  
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. at 120 (“The importance of establishing regulatory clarity for online political ads 
was on display in 2016 when Russian-backed interests purchased political ads on Facebook.”). 
 210. Cf. Sara Morrison, Why Are You Seeing This Digital Political Ad? No One Knows!, VOX 
(Sept. 29, 2020, 8:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/9/29/21439824/online-digital-
political-ads-facebook-google [https://perma.cc/4S8Q-8LPA] (explaining that, since there is no 
“ad archive requirement,” law enforcement cannot effectively pursue “potential law-breaking”). 
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and remains to this day, ineffective. Since the late 1990s, the number of 
MURs initiated each year has remained relatively constant, but the 
percentage of internally generated MURs has declined precipitously. 
As a result, contemporary third-party enforcement, shaped by robust 
federal disclosure law and technological advancements, plays an 
increasingly important role in deterring campaign finance violations. 
Fortunately, third-party enforcement is much more efficacious than 
portrayed in the literature. This Note proposes that the FEC improve 
its enforcement processes and strive for fairer elections by capitalizing 
on the benefits of third-party enforcement of campaign finance 
violations.  
 
